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14 May 1953

NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be
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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT:

Items for Discussion at FSB Informal Meeting
14 May 1953

1. Following are some ideas which I would like to add to those
contained in the attached memorandum to you from [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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c. Regarding item two on the agenda, I might say that
the present Jackson Committee recommendations regarding

FSB is

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PBS is to eliminate it but transfer some of its functions to an Operations Coordinating Board which is recommended as a new sub-committee of the NSC. The recommended OCB membership is the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director for Mutual Security (Mr. Stassen to serve until he designates his General Deputy to serve in his place), the Director of CIA and the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War.

The Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (General Cutler), should sit with the Board. The head of the Foreign Information Program, wherever it be located, should be invited to attend those meetings of the Board in which the subjects under discussion relate directly to his function.

The Chairman, who will also control the Board's staff, is a decision left to the President. Two alternatives however are proposed:

(1) If the President selects a chairman who will give the major portion of his time to the Board (presumably C. D. Jackson) such individual should determine the agenda, preside over the Board and supervise the staff.

(2) If the President selects as chairman an official who is already burdened with heavy responsibilities (presumably General Smith) then it is recommended that the staff should be headed by a man of competence and experience appointed by the President. The chairman in this case would become merely a presiding officer. (The fine hand of [] can be seen in these two alternatives).

The principal task of the OCB is stated to be "coordination with respect to departmental execution of NSC policies." Presumably it will operate as follows:

The NSC having approved a particular policy will refer it to the OCB for implementation. OCB will then determine the most appropriate and effective method of implementation which might consist in some cases in assigning the entire task to a single department. Where however there are a number of departmental interests OCB will assign planning responsibilities to the appropriate departments and agencies and then coordinate and follow up the execution of these planning assignments. A staff member of OCB will also keep

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himself informed as to the developments under each NSC policy with a view to reporting successes or failures to the OCB for further report to the NSC. We feel that the proposal as it stands is acceptable provided that the following two recommendations clearly appear (and these conditions cannot be too strongly emphasized since if they are omitted we should take every possible step to have them included):

(1) The OCB should be given no responsibilities for review or approval of covert projects and programs. The 10/2 mechanism is sufficient for this purpose and therefore nothing additional is needed. OCB will have an adequate connection with covert activities through its normal operations and through the DCI membership on the Board.

(2) The report should specifically recommend the rescission of NSC 10/5.

(N.B. Language setting forth the above two conditions has been given to the Jackson Committee Staff and it is believed that it will be acceptable. [redacted] however is following the matter closely and if there is any danger that it isn't accepted, we will immediately be notified. In view of this I would suggest that Mr. Dulles not mention these conditions unless some contrary thought is stated at the meeting.)

d. The Hickenlooper Sub-Committee recommendations have not been seen by anyone in PP but it is believed that Mr. Dulles has some familiarity with them. At any rate we have nothing to contribute on this point.

e. The item three on the agenda regarding responsibility for "gray" programs is of course a tremendous subject with which Mr. Dulles has considerable familiarity. I believe that he knows but it is perhaps worthwhile repeating that the PP Staff are willing to follow the lines of the old State-CIA, NSA-CIA agreement.

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